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OPINION DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS THROUGH MEAN–FIELD
GAMES∗
D. BAUSO† , H. TEMBINE‡ , AND T. BAS¸AR§
Abstract. Emulation, mimicry, and herding behaviors are phenomena that are observed when
multiple social groups interact. To study such phenomena, we consider in this paper a large pop-
ulation of homogeneous social networks. Each such network is characterized by a vector state, a
vector-valued controlled input and a vector-valued exogenous disturbance. The controlled input of
each network is to align its state to the mean distribution of other networks’ states in spite of the
actions of the disturbance. One of the contributions of this paper is a detailed analysis of the result-
ing mean field game for the cases of both polytopic and L2 bounds on controls and disturbances.
A second contribution is the establishment of a robust mean-field equilibrium, that is, a solution in-
cluding the worst-case value function, the state feedback best-responses for the controlled inputs and
worst-case disturbances, and a density evolution. This solution is characterized by the property that
no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation even in the presence of the disturbance. As a third
contribution, microscopic and macroscopic analyses are carried out to show convergence properties
of the population distribution using stochastic stability theory.
Key words. Opinion dynamics, mean field games, stochastic stability
1. Introduction. As social networks are gaining increasing grounds and popu-
larity, thus influencing political and socio-economic realities, a rigorous understand-
ing of the relationships between macroscopic and microscopic opinion propagation is
sparking interest among scientists in different disciplines, from engineering to eco-
nomics, from finance to game theory, just to name a few. It has been observed that
the evolution of opinions as a result of the interactions among agents has the flavor of
an averaging process (Ayesel 2008, Castellano et al. 2009, Krause 2000, Hegselmann
and Krause 2002, Pluchino et al. 2006). While with global interaction consensus can
be reached, with local interactions only clusters of consensus opinions may emerge
(Blondel et al. 2010). More specifically, such a clustering occurs when agents interact
only with their neighbors, these being those carrying a similar opinion, and avoiding
any contact with those who think differently. To capture the differences in the asymp-
totic values of the opinions, the literature offers a Lagrangian model of “dissensus”
which makes use of graph theory and the theory of stochastic stability (Acemog˘lu et
al. 2013, Arnold 1974).
In this paper, rather than one single network, we consider a large number of
homogeneous social networks; see Fig. 1.1. Therefore we have two layers: individual
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networks and a global network. In the last part of the work, we add a third layer as
we consider a multi-population model, each population involving a large number of
homogenous networks.
Fig. 1.1. Network of networks.
We consider two different scenarios, depending on whether the controls and the
disturbances are polytopic or L2 bounded. In the first case, the daily interactions
among the players are captured by a vector payoff, one component per player. The
state of the network is the cumulative payoff up to the current time. The perspective
we adopt is a worst-case one, in the sense that each network state is affected by an
adversarial disturbance beyond the presence of a controlled input. Thus the resulting
game on each network is a two-player repeated one, with vector payoffs. The first
player selects the controlled input, while the second player chooses the adversarial
disturbance. In the second case, we model the game as a differential one between
the controller and the adversary where both the controls and the disturbances are
L2-gain bounded. The dynamics is a typical fluid flow over a network, and thus the
state represents the buffer level at each node.
The difference between the two settings, characterized by polytopic and L2-gain
bounds, is that the disturbance has bounded instantaneous fluctuations in the former
setting, while the disturbance may have unbounded instantaneous fluctuations but
has bounded energy in the latter setting.
The interaction in the “global network” is based on the common knowledge of
the average, which is global knowledge. In particular, in both cases, that is under
both polytopic and L2-gain bounds, given a current state distribution over the entire
population (of networks), the controlled input of a single network attempts to steer
the state to the average of the state distribution. This resembles herd behavior or
crowd-seeking attitudes in that certain social groups tend to mimic the behavior of
other social groups. In addition to this, adversarial disturbances may accommodate
imperfect or partial information, as well as irrational behaviors on the part of some
players. In the last part of the paper, we also study local interactions, in the case of
multiple populations.
A similar emulation behavior can be observed in financial markets under the
name of “stock market bubbles”, which sees investors to emulate other investors.
A third application area is in everyday decision making in that decisions are made
on the basis of the observed information (past decisions), thus influencing successive
decisions. Such a phenomenon is known as “cascaded information” (Banerjee 1992,
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Bauso et al. 2012).
Highlights of the results. A first result in this paper involves providing a
mean field game framework that captures the interactions among a large number
of networks where herding behavior is rewarding. Mean-field games provide better
insights on the strategic nature of the interactions between the players. Players are
not “programmed” to behave in a certain way, but they have their own criteria (cost
or utility functionals) and their behaviors are captured by their best-responses to
the population behavior. We consider the cases of both polytopic and L2 bounds
on controls and disturbances. The novelty of the proposed model is in the two-layer
structure. At the lower layer, we have two-player repeated games, one for each network
in the polytopic case, and a differential game with network flow dynamics in the L2
case. At the higher layer, a large number of networks interact according to a mean
field game model in the case of b oth polytopic and L2 bounds.
For the mean field game at hand, a second result is that we establish a robust
mean-field equilibrium, that is, a solution including the worst-case value function, the
state feedback best-responses for the controlled inputs and worst-case disturbances
and a density evolution. This solution is characterized by the property that no player
can benefit from a unilateral deviation even in the presence of the disturbance. The
robust mean-field equilibrium is an extension to the case of infinite players of the
robust Nash equilibrium concept in differential games already existing in the literature
(Bas¸ar and Olsder 1999, Bas¸ar 1992).
As a third contribution, microscopic and macroscopic analyses are carried out to
show convergence properties of the population distribution. This is accomplished by
resorting to Markov chain stability tools and stochastic stability (Arnold 1974, Gard
1988, Thygesen 1997). Under suitable assumptions, we show that the population
state converges in both mean and variance. As a further contribution, we emphasize
the structural features of the networks by establishing a relation between the Fiedler
eigenvalue or algebraic connectivity of the Laplacian matrix of the controlled network
and the maximal eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the uncontrolled network.
The results in this paper constitute substantial generalizations of those in the two
earlier conference papers (Bauso and Bas¸ar 2012) and (Bauso et al. 2013). Specifically,
first the earlier scalar results (briefly summarized in Section 4.5) have been generalized
to the vector case. Second, a study of polytopic bounds has been included (Section 3)
in addition to the L2-gain bounds. Third, local interactions and network topologies
have been studied (Section 5) and these new results have been supported by additional
numerical studies (as Examples 2 and 3 in Section 6).
Related literature on mean field games. Mean field games originated in the
works of J. M. Lasry and P. L. Lions (Lasry and Lions 2006a,b, 2007) and indepen-
dently in those of M.Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and R. Malhame´ (Huang et al. 2003,
2006, 2007). The featuring aspect is that the strategy choices of a single agent are
influenced by the mass behavior of the other agents. In addition to this, the closely
related notion of Oblivious Equilibrium for large population dynamic games was in-
troduced by G. Weintraub, C. Benkard, and B. Van Roy (Weintraub et al. 2005) in
the framework of Markov Decision Processes. Mean-field games find applications in
many diverse domains, including economics, physics, biology, and network and pro-
duction engineering (Achdou et al. 2012, Bauso et al. 2012, Gueant et al. 2010, Huang
et al. 2007, Lachapelle et al. 2010, Pesenti and Bauso 2013).
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The mathematical characterization of a mean field game consists of a system of
two partial differential equations (PDEs). The first PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs (HJI) equation whose solution is the value function which is parametrized
in the population distribution (Bauso et al. 2012). The HJI equation is coupled
with a second PDE, known as Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation, defined
on variable population distribution and parametrized in the value function (Achdou
and Capuzzo Dolcetta 2010, Lasry and Lions 2007, Tembine et al. 2011, 2014, Zhu et
al. 2011).
Explicit closed-form expressions for mean field equilibria are available only for
a limited class of problems, among which is the class of linear-quadratic mean field
games; see (Bardi 2012) among others. As an alternative to explicit solutions, a
variety of numerical approaches are available which hinge on discretization and finite
difference approximations (Achdou and Capuzzo Dolcetta 2010).
Evolutionary games constitute another stream of literature strongly connected to
mean field games and large population games (Selten 1970, Jovanovic and Rosenthal
1988, Tembine et al. 2009). A first attempt to introduce dynamics in such games can
be seen in (Jovanovic and Rosenthal 1988) for a discrete time version of anonymous
stochastic games, which represent precursors of mean field games.
More recently, and in the spirit of the present paper, the notion of robustness
has been brought into the picture. Robust mean field games aim to achieve robust
performance and/or stability in the presence of unknown disturbances when there
is a large number of players; see (Tembine et al. 2011, 2014), where relations with
risk-sensitive games and risk-neutral games have been studied.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the
problem and introduce the model. In Section 3 we analyze the case of polytopic
bounds on control and disturbance. In Section 4 we consider the case of L2 bounds
on control and disturbance. In Section 6 we provide numerical examples. Finally, in
Section 7 we draw some conclusions. Even though the proofs of the results are not
auxiliary material but constitute an essential part and contribution of the paper, we
find it more convenient for readability purposes to collect them all in an appendix,
toward the end of the paper.
Notation We let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space. We let B be a finite-
dimensional standard Brownian motion process defined on this probability space. We
define F = (Ft)t≥0, its natural filtration augmented by all the P−null sets (sets of
measure-zero with the respect P). We write ∂x and ∂2xx to stand respectively for the
gradient vector operator and the Hessian matrix operator with respect to x. We write
div to mean the divergence operator. Given any matrix A, we write Tr(A) to denote
its trace. We denote by [0, T ] the time interval (horizon) over which the game evolves.
Given a stochastic process X[0,T ] over [0, T ], and its value at t ∈ [0, T ] denoted by
X(t), and given a scalar ξ, the expression P(X(t) ≤ ξ) stands for “the probability”
that the event {X(t) ≤ ξ} occurs. Given a set U we denote by |U | its cardinality,
when it is appropriate. We denote by I the identity matrix.
2. Formal statement of the problem. We consider a “large population”
of networks, i.e., social groups characterized by a controlled time-varying behav-
ior/state/characteristics. By “large population” we mean a large number of homoge-
neous networks, namely, the scenario where the players’ interactions in each network
are similar. Each network is subject to controlled inputs and adversarial disturbances.
The characteristic of each network is an n-dimensional opinion vector X(t) ∈ Rn
at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The control variable, which is the rate of variation of the group’s
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opinion, is a measurable function of time, u(·) ∈ U , where U ⊆ Rp is the control set
and p is a positive integer. An adversary (persuader or stubborn agent) attempts to
disturb the group’s opinions in a way that is proportional to his advertisement efforts
w(·) ∈ W , where W ⊆ Rq is the control set of the adversary, which we will call
disturbance set. In a nutshell, we have
• X : [0, T ]→ Rn, t 7→ X(t), group’s opinion at time t, and x its initial opinion
at time t = 0
• u : [0, T ]→ U , t 7→ u(t), control at time t
• w : [0, T ]→W , t 7→ w(t), disturbance at time t
In accordance with the above, the opinion dynamics of each group can be written
in general terms as{
dX(t) = f(X(t), u(t), w(t))dt+ σdB(t), t > 0
X(0) = x,
(2.1)
where f : Rn × U ×W → Rn, σ > 0 is a scalar weighting coefficient and B(t) is a
standard vector Brownian motion. For the sake of notational simplicity, and since
groups are homogeneous, we do not index X, u, w, B by i even though they are
associated with a generic group i. Note also that the Brownian motion processes are
independent across groups.
Consider a probability density function m : Rn × [0,+∞[→ R, (x, t) 7→ m(x, t),
representing the density of the groups whose collective opinion is x at time t, which
satisfies
∫
Rn m(x, t)dx = 1 for every t. Let us also define the mean opinion over groups
at time t as m(t) :=
∫
Rn xm(x, t)dx.
The objective of a group is to adjust its vector opinion based on the average
opinion of the other groups. This reflects a typical crowd-seeking behavior in that
emulating others makes an agent more comfortable and at ease.
Accordingly consider, for each group, a running cost g : Rn × Rn × U ×W →
[0,+∞[, (x,m, u,w) 7→ g(x,m, u,w) of the form:
g(x,m, u,w) =
1
2
[
(m− x)T Q (m− x) + uTCu+ wTΓw
]
, (2.2)
where Q and C are positive definite, and Γ is negative definite.
The above cost describes i) the (weighted) square deviation of an individual’s
state from the mean state computed over the entire population, ii) the (weighted)
energy of the control, and iii) the (weighted) energy of the disturbance. Such a cost
reflects the willingness of the individuals to mimic the mean population behavior as
it happens in herd behavior or crowd-seeking attitudes.
Also consider a terminal cost Ψ : Rn × Rn → [0,+∞[, (x,m) 7→ Ψ(x,m) of the
form
Ψ(x,m) =
1
2
(m− x)TS(m− x), (2.3)
where S is positive definite. The problem in its generic form is then the following:
Problem 1.
Corresponding to a generic group, let B be a standard Brownian Motion, inde-
pendent across components, defined on (Ω,F ,P), where F is the natural filtration
generated by B. Let the initial state X(0) be independent of B and with density
m0 : Rn → R. Given a finite horizon T > 0, the initial density m0, a suitable running
cost: g : Rn × Rn × U ×W → [0,+∞[, (x,m, u,w) 7→ g(x,m, u,w), as in (2.2); a
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terminal cost Ψ : Rn × Rn → [0,+∞[, (m,x) 7→ Ψ(m,x), as in (2.3), and given a
suitable dynamics f : Rn×U ×W → Rn for X as in (2.1), solve the minmax problem
inf
u(·)∈U
sup
w(·)∈W
{
J(x, u(·), w(·),m(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
g(X(t),m(t), u(t), w(t))dt
+Ψ(X(T ),m(T ))
]}
, (2.4)
where m¯ is the first moment of m, as introduced earlier, and U and W are the sets of
all measurable functions u(·) and w(·) from [0, T ] to U and W , respectively.
2.1. Turning the problem into a mean field game. Let us denote by v(x, t)
the (upper) value of the robust optimization problem defined above, under worst-case
disturbance starting from time t at state x. The first step is to show that the problem
results in the following mean field game system for the unknown scalar functions
v(x, t), and m(x, t) when each group behaves according to (2.4):

∂tv(x, t) + inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
{∂xv(x, t)f(x, u, w) + g(x,m, u,w)}
+σ
2
2 Tr
(
∂2xxv(x, t)
)
= 0 in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(x,m) ∀ x ∈ Rn,
∂tm(x, t) + div(m(x, t) · f(x, u∗, w∗))− σ22 Tr(∂2xxm(x, t)) = 0,
m(x, 0) = m0(x).
(2.5)
In the above, u∗(t, x) and w∗(t, x, u) are the optimal time-varying state-feedback
controls and disturbances, respectively, obtained as u
∗(t, x) ∈ arg minu∈U{∂xv(x, t)f(x, u, w∗) + g(x,m, u,w∗)},
w∗(t, x, u) ∈ arg maxw∈W {∂xv(x, t)f(x, u, w∗) + g(x,m, u,w)},
(2.6)
where we have implicitly assumed that in the HJI equation in (2.5), inf and sup can
be replaced by min and max, respectively.
The mean field game system (2.5) appears in the form of two coupled PDEs
intertwined in a forward-backward way. The first equation in (2.5) is the HJI equation
with variable v(x, t) and parametrized in m(·). Given the boundary condition on final
state (second equation in (2.5)), and assuming a given population behavior captured
by m(·), the HJI equation is solved backwards and returns the value function and
best-response behavior of the individuals (first equation in (2.6)) as well as the worst
adversarial response (second equation in (2.6)). The HJI equation is coupled with a
second PDE, known as Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) (third equation in (2.5)),
defined on variable m(·) and parametrized in v(x, t). Given the boundary condition
on initial density m(x, 0) = m0(x) (fourth equation in (2.5)), and assuming a given
individual behavior described by u∗, the FPK equation is solved forward and returns
the population behavior time evolution m(x, t).
Noting that the distribution enters the cost through its mean, we can simplify
the above system through model reduction. Indeed, we can replace the FPK equation
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by an ordinary differential equation in the variable mean distribution and obtain the
following system:
∂tv(x, t) + inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
{
∂xv(x, t)f(x, u, w) + g(x,m, u,w)
}
+σ
2
2 Tr(∂
2
xxv(x, t)) = 0 in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(x,m) ∀ x ∈ Rn
d
dt
m(t) =
∫
f(x, u∗, w∗)m(x, t)dx,
m(0) = m0.
(2.7)
Any solution of the above system of equations along with (2.6) is referred to as
worst-disturbance feedback mean-field equilibrium as no individual benefits arise from
deviating from the adopted strategy.
3. Polytopic bounds on control and disturbances. We specialize the above
model to the case where i) the control and the disturbances are probability distribu-
tions over Euclidean spaces, ii) the dynamics is “normalized” and bilinear in control
and disturbance, and iii) the running cost does not depend on the control and distur-
bance. More formally,
• the control set U = ∆(Rp), where ∆(Rp) is the simplex in Rp
• the disturbance set W = ∆(Rq), where ∆(Rq) is the simplex in Rq
• function f : U ×W → [− 1, 1]n is bilinear
• function g : Rn×Rn → [0,+∞[ depends only on state x and mean distribution
m
Each player then solves the following special case of Problem 1:
infu(·)∈U supw(·)∈W
{
J(x, u(·), w(·),m(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
g(X(t),m(t))dt
+Ψ(X(T ),m(T ))
]}
dX(t) = f(u(t), w(t))dt+ σdB(t), X(0) = x.
(3.1)
The above dynamics describes the cumulative payoff in a two player repeated game
with vector payoffs, which is studied next.
3.1. Repeated two player game with vector payoffs. Consider a two player
repeated game where player 1 plays u(t) ∈ U ≡ ∆(Rp), player 2 plays w ∈ W ≡
∆(Rq), and f : U × W → [ − 1, 1]n is the payoff. We assume that f is bilinear
in u and w. We denote by G the one-shot vector payoff game (U,W, f(t)). With
respect to the above game, in the spirit of attainability (Lehrer et al. 2011), we aim
at analyzing convergence properties of the disturbed cumulative payoff X(t) obtained
by integrating (in the sense of Itoˆ) the stochastic differential equation in (3.1),
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
f(u(t), w(t))dt+ σB(t), X(0) = x. (3.2)
Toward this goal, we will make use of the notion of projected game which we recall
next. Let us consider λ ∈ Rn and denote by 〈λ,G〉 the one-shot zero-sum game whose
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set of players and their actions are as in game G, and the amount player 2 pays to
player 1 is λT f(u,w)). Note that, as a zero-sum one-shot game, the game 〈γ,G〉 has
a value, denoted by val[λ], obtained as
val[λ] := infu∈∆(U)supw∈∆(W ){λT f(u,w)}.
Assumption 3.1. (Attainability condition) The value of the projected game,
val[λ], is negative for every λ ∈ Rn, i.e.,
val[λ] := infu∈∆(U)supw∈∆(W ){λT f(u,w)} < 0, ∀λ ∈ Rn. (3.3)
It is worth noting that, denoting the set of all possible payoffs for a fixed mixed action
u of player 1 by D1(u) = {f(u,w) : w ∈ ∆(Rq)}, then the attainability condition (3.3)
implies that for every λ ∈ Rn there always exists a u such that D1(u) is contained in
the open half space H := {x ∈ Rn|λTx < 0} in Rn (Lehrer et al. 2011).
3.2. Uncertain network flow control problems. Consider the continuous
time dynamic system (3.4) where X(t) ∈ Rn is the state variable, and F ∈ Rn×p and
G ∈ Rn×q are the controlled matrices (Blanchini et al. 2000):{
dX(t) = (Fu(t)− Ew(t))dt+ σdB(t),
X(0) = x.
(3.4)
We can think of F ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×p and E{−1, 0, 1}n×q as incidence matrices of hy-
pergraphs. Here, t 7→ u(t) is the measurable control, taking values, for all t ≥ 0, in
the set of constant controls (3.5) with preassigned vectors u− and u+, and t 7→ w(t)
is the measurable unknown disturbance, taking values, for all t ≥ 0, in the set of
constant disturbances (3.6) with preassigned vectors w− and w+:
U =
{
µ ∈ Rp
∣∣∣u−i ≤ µi ≤ u+i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,p} , (3.5)
W =
{
ω ∈ Rq
∣∣∣w−i ≤ ωi ≤ w+i , ∀j = 1, . . . ,q} . (3.6)
The above dynamics tell us that matrix F combines the controls u(t) in order to
counterbalance the disturbance w(t). A state variable X(t) accumulates up to time
t any discrepancies in the counterbalancing action. Such a dynamics often arises in
network flow (Bauso et al. 2010, Blanchini et al. 1997).
In (Blanchini et al. 2000), in the absence of Brownian motion, and for the cor-
responding ordinary differential equation of (3.4) (where σ = 0), the authors pro-
vide a solution to the problem of finding a control strategy that drives the state
X(t) from any initial point in a preassigned set Q0 to any point of a given set
Q = {ξ ∈ Rn : ξ−i ≤ ξ ≤ ξ+i }, with assigned bounds ξ−i , ξ+i ∈ Rn, strictly in-
cluding Q0. This problem goes under the name of reachability control problem, and
its formal statement is adapted from (Blanchini et al. 2000) and reproduced below.
Definition 3.1. (Robust reachability problem) Find a control strategy u(t) =
ψ(X(t)) such that for all x ∈ Q0 and for any w(t) ∈ W there exists a τ > 0 and a
solution X(t) to equation X˙(t) = Fu(t) + Ew(t) satisfying X(t) ∈ Q, for all t ≥ τ
and u(t) ∈ U, for all t ≥ 0.
Whenever the above problem is feasible we say that the set Q is reachable in a
robust sense, i.e., for any w ∈W (Bertsekas and Rhodes 1971).
It turns out that a necessary and sufficient condition for the above problem to
be feasible is the “dominance” condition (3.7) as proved in (Blanchini et al. 1997,
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2000). Formally, suppose that matrix E is full row rank; then the reachability control
problem is feasible for the continuous time system{
X˙(t) = Fu(t)− Ew(t),
X(0) = x ∈ Q0,
if and only if the set EW :=
{
Eω
∣∣∣ω ∈W} is in the interior of the set FU :={
Fµ
∣∣∣µ ∈ U}, that is,
EW ⊆ int{FU}. (3.7)
In the rest of this section, we first show how to turn the network system (3.4)
into the stochastic differential equation in (3.1) and then we describe the fundamental
relations between the reachability condition (3.7) and the attainability condition (3.3)
developed in the previous subsection for the repeated game.
To do this, let us look at X(t) as the vector valued payoff function of a two player
game as in (3.2), where one player, the controller, selects action u(t) ∈ U and the
other player, nature, selects the disturbance w(t) ∈W .
In addition to this, let us denote by vert{U} the set of vertices of U and similarly
for vert{W}, and let p = |vert{U}| (number of vertices in U). Likewise, let us take
q = |vert{W}|. Also, let us use the symbol u(i), i = 1, . . . , p to denote the generic ith
vertex in U and similarly for w(j), j = 1, . . . , q.
We now formalize a game where both players select vertices from their respective
bounding polytopic sets. More formally, consider the set of actions vert{U} and
vert{W} for the control and the disturbance, and observe that mixed actions lie in
the simplices in Rp and Rq respectively, i.e., u ∈ ∆(Rp) and w ∈ ∆(Rq). Let us take
as cumulative payoff at time t the function
X(t) =
∫ t
0
f(u(t), w(t))dt =
∫ t
0
(
F
p∑
i=1
ui(t)u
(i) + E
q∑
j=1
wj(t)w
(j)
)
dt+X(0), (3.8)
where ui is the probability assigned to control u
(i), wj the probability assigned to
disturbance w(j). We are now in a position to state one of the main results of this
paper.
Theorem 3.2. If condition (3.7) holds, then the payoff function f(u,w) in (3.8)
satisfies the attainability condition (3.3).
Proof. Given in the appendix.
To see how players’ interactions over networks captured by the network system
(3.4) turn into the stochastic differential equation used in (3.1), consider the following
example borrowed from (Lehrer et al. 2011).
Example 1.
Consider the network depicted in Fig. 3.1 where nodes represent two opposite
states of the characteristics of a population, such as political opinions (left-right), so-
cial behavior (cooperative-noncooperative) or marketing strategies (aggressive-nonaggressive).
Suppose that a central planner or persuasor can influence the flow of people entering
each state, and let us represent this by three controlled flows. A unit of flow f1 pro-
duces a unitary increase of state X1 per time unit. Similarly, flow f2 represents a
migration of people from state X1 to state X2 per time unit. A unit of flow f3 produces
a unitary increase of people in state X2 per time unit. Uncontrolled flows w1 and w2
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f1
f2
f3
w1
w2
Fig. 3.1. Network system.
represent migrations from X1 and X2 driven by exogenous forces. The associated
dynamics then read:[
X˙1
X˙2
]
=
[
1 −1 0
0 1 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
 f t1f t2
f t3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(t)
−
[
wt1
wt2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(t)
.
Now, suppose that migrations occur only in batches and therefore take for instance
fi ∈ {−5,−2, 1, 6}, and wi ∈ {−3, 2}.
Let us enumerate all the actions of players 1 and 2, so that we have vert{U} =
{u(1), . . . , u(p)} and vert{W} = {w(1), . . . , w(q)} with p = 43 and q = 22.
The complete matrix of vector payoffs is then obtained from the following table,
where each entry represents a possible vector payoff f(u,w):
u(i)/w(j) w(1) . . . w(q)
u(1) Fu(1) − w(1) . . . Fu(1) − w(q)
...
...
...
u(p)
For sake of conciseness, we can simply extract from the above table the rows corre-
sponding to the following four actions of player 1:
u(1) = (1,−2, 6),u(2) = (1,−2,−5),
u(3) = (−5, 1,−5), u(4) = (−5, 1, 6).
For player 2, we consider the following four actions:
w(1) = (−3,−3),w(2) = (2,−3),
w(3) = (−3, 2), w(4) = (2, 2).
Control and disturbance pure action sets are then vert{U} = {u(1), . . . , u(4)} and
vert{W} = {w(1), . . . , w(4)}, respectively.
The following 4 × 4 matrix includes all possible vector payoffs corresponding to
pure actions of both players:
(6, 7) (1, 7) (6, 2) (1, 2)
(6,−4) (1,−4) (6,−9) (1,−9)
(−3,−1) (−8,−1) (−3,−6) (−8,−6)
(−3, 10) (−8, 10) (−3, 5) (−8, 5)
 . (3.9)
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Function f(u,w) is the bilinear extension to mixed strategies u,w ∈ ∆(R4) of such a
vector payoff matrix,
[
X˙1
X˙2
]
= f(u,w) =
[
1 −1 0
0 1 1
] 4∑
i=1
uiu
(i) −
4∑
j=1
wjw
(j).
Note that we can always normalize f(·) so as to have (∆(R4),∆(R4)) 7→ [− 1, 1]n.
3.3. A solution for the polytopic case. Let Assumption 3.1 hold true. Now,
for given x, take for λ the value λ(∂xv) =
∂xv(x,t)
‖∂xv(x,t)‖ which is the gradient direction on
x. Then, we can introduce the value of the projected anti-gradient game
val[∂xv(x, t)] := λ(∂xv)
T f(u∗, w∗). (3.10)
Also let us introduce
Aij := f(1i,1j) ∈ [−1, 1]n, (3.11)
where 1i ∈ Rp is a unit vector with all zero components except the ith one which is
equal to 1, and similarly for 1j ∈ Rq.
We can then establish the following result.
Theorem 3.3. The mean-field game for the crowd-seeking opinion propagation
with polytopic bounds is
∂tv(x, t) + ‖∂xv(x, t)‖val[∂xv(x, t)] + 12 (m(t)− x)TQ(m(t)− x)
+ 12σ
2Tr(∂2xxv(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in Rn,
∂tm(x, t) + div(m(x, t) ·Ai∗j∗)− σ22 Tr(∂2xxm) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rn,
(3.12)
where ‖∂xv(x, t)‖ is the 2-norm of the vector ∂xv(x, t) and val[∂xv(x, t)] is the value
of the projected anti-gradient game as in (3.10). Furthermore, the optimal control and
worst-case disturbance are{
u∗(x, t) = i∗ = arg mini∈I supj∈J λ(∂xv)
TAij
w∗(x, t) = j∗ = arg maxj∈J λ(∂xv)TAij .
(3.13)
Proof. Given in the appendix.
In principle, to find the optimal control input we need to solve the two coupled
PDEs in (3.12) in v and m with given boundary conditions (second and last condi-
tions).
Note that since the HJI equation depends explicitly on the mean of the mean
field and not on the higher moments, one can reduce the mean field system to a lower
dimensional one. The reduced mean-field system of the robust mean-field game can
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be written as
∂tv(x, t) + ‖∂xv‖val[∂xv] + 12 (m(t)− x)TQ(m(t)− x)
+ 12σ
2Tr(∂2xxv(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in Rn,
d
dtm(t) =
∫
Ai∗j∗m(x, t)dx in Rn,
m(0) = m0 =
∫
Rn xm0(x)dx,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rn.
(3.14)
Also note that since the function f is bounded and the cost functional is strictly
convex in x and u, the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the above is a direct
consequence of the theorem in (Øksendal 2003) chapter 5.2. Indeed, jumps of j are
finite when the trajectory is far from the switching surfaces, and once the trajectory
hits a switching surface either it leaves it or it evolves along it in which case one
needs to refer to a solution at least in the sense of (Filippov 1964). From a numerical
perspective a way to regularize the RHS of the dynamics is to introduce a low-pass
filter and therefore to turn jumps into smooth transitions from one vertex to another.
3.3.1. Microscopic model. In this subsection we provide a microscopic de-
scription of the system based on a linearized approximation of the model and a finite
set of players {1, . . . , ν}. Let us denote by Yi(t) for all i = 1, . . . , ν, the corresponding
state of each player.
To linearize the system, suppose that we can replace f(u∗, w∗) = Ai∗,j∗ by
f(u,w) = −δ∂xv, for a scalar δ > 0. Also, let us take v(Yi, t) = Y Ti φ(t)Yi for an
opportune positive definite matrix φ and for all Yi ∈ Rn. Then the resulting linear
dynamics are captured by the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dYi(t) = δφ(t)(m− Yi(t))dt+ σdBi(t), (3.15)
where Bi(t) is a vector Brownian motion affecting the dynamics of player i.
A first observation is that the mean opinion m(t) = 1ν
∑ν
i=1 Yi(t) is a stochastic
process which evolves according to
dm(t) = 1ν
∑ν
i=1 dYi(t)
= 1ν
∑ν
i=1
(
δφ(t)(m− Yi(t))dt+ σdBi(t)
)
= 1ν
∑ν
i=1
(
δφ(t)( 1ν
∑ν
j=1 Yj(t)− Yi(t))dt+ σdBi(t)
)
= 1ν
∑ν
i=1 σdBi(t).
(3.16)
and with 1st moment always equal to zero, i.e.,
Edm(t) = 0.
Since we wish to analyze convergence of the players’ opinions to their average,
let us observe that for the ith error we can write the expression below, which relates
ei(t) to Yi(t):
ei(t) = m(t)− Yi(t).
12
The next result establishes that the errors are stochastically bounded with respect
to the mean opinion.
Theorem 3.4. For each pi > 0, there exists an ε(pi) > 0 such that
P(‖ei(t)‖∞ ≤ ε(pi)) > 1− pi. (3.17)
Proof. Given in the appendix.
4. L2-gain bounds. We next study the second model, where i) the control and
the disturbances are bounded in L2, ii) the dynamics are “normalized” and bilinear
in control and disturbance, and iii) the running cost penalizes both the control and
the disturbance in square norm. More formally,
• the control set U = Rp
• the disturbance set W = Rq
• function f : U ×W → Rn is linear and of the form
f(u,w) = Fu+ Ew, (4.1)
where F ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×p and E ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×q, and represent incidence
matrices of hypergraphs
• the running cost g : Rn×Rn×U ×W → [0,+∞[, (x,m, u,w) 7→ g(x,m, u,w)
is of the form:
g(x,m, u,w) =
1
2
[
(m− x)T Q (m− x) + uTCu− γ2wTw
]
where Q > 0, C > 0 and we take Γ from (2.2) equal to −γ2I, where I is the
identity matrix of appropriate dimensions. The above cost describes i) the
square deviation of an individual’s state from the mean state computed over
the whole population, ii) the energy of the control, and iii) the energy of the
disturbance.
Each player solves the following special case of Problem 1:
infu(·)∈U supw(·)∈W
{
J(x, u(·), w(·),m(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
1
2 [(m−X(t))T Q (m−X(t))
+u(t)TCu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)]dt+ Ψ(X(T ),m(T ))
]}
,
dX(t) = [Fu(t) + Ew(t)]dt+ σdB(t), X(0) = x.
(4.2)
4.1. The mean field game for the L2-gain bounds case. Let the Hamilto-
nian (without disturbance w) be given by
H(x, p,m) = inf
u
{
g˜(x,m, u) + ΠTFu
}
,
where Π is the co-state and
g˜(x,m, u) =
1
2
[
(m− x)T Q (m− x) + uTCu
]
.
The robust Hamiltonian is then
H˜(x, p,m) = H(x, p,m) + sup
w
{
ΠTEw − 1
2
γ2wTw
}
.
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After solving for w we obtain
w∗ =
1
γ2
ET∂xv(x, t).
Introducing the Hamiltonian and the expression for w∗ in the mean-field system (2.5)
we obtain
∂tv(x, t) +H(x, p,m) +
1
2γ2
(∂xv(x, t)
TEET∂xv(x, t))
+σ
2
2 Tr(∂
2
xxv(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x) in Rn,
∂tm(x, t) + div
(
m(x, t)∂pH(x, p,m)
)
+
1
γ2
div
(
m(x, t)EET∂xv(x, t)
)
−σ22 Tr(∂2xxm(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rn,
(4.3)
We are now in a position to specialize the results obtained above to the case of a
crowd-seeking opinion propagation.
Theorem 4.1. The mean-field system of the robust mean field game for the
crowd-seeking L2 bounded opinion propagation system is
∂tv(x, t) +
1
2∂xv(x, t)
T
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
∂xv(x, t)
+ 12 (m(t)− x)TQ(m(t)− x) + 12σ2Tr(∂2xxv(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in Rn,
∂tm(x, t) + div
(
m(x, t)(− 12C−1FFT + 12γ2EET )∂xv(x, t)
)
− 12σ2Tr(∂2xxm(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rn.
(4.4)
Furthermore, the optimal control and worst-case disturbance are{
u∗(x, t) = −C−1FT∂xv(x, t)
w∗(x, t) = 1γ2E
T∂xv(x, t).
(4.5)
Proof. Given in the appendix.
The significance of the above result is that to find the optimal control input
we need to solve the two coupled PDEs in (4.4) in v and m with given boundary
conditions (second and last conditions). This is usually done by iteratively solving
the HJI equation for fixed m and by entering the optimal u obtained from (4.5) in
the FPK equation in (4.4) until a fixed point in v and m is reached.
Note that since the HJI equation depends explicitly on the mean of the mean
field and not on the other moments, one can reduce the mean field system to a lower
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dimensional system. The reduced mean-field system of the robust mean-field game is
∂tv(x, t) +
1
2∂xv(x, t)
T
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
∂xv(x, t)
+ 12 (m(t)− x)TQ(m(t)− x) + 12σ2Tr(∂2xxv(x, t)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in Rn,
d
dtm(t) = Fu(t)
∗ + Ew(t)∗ in Rn,
m(0) = m0 =
∫
Rn xm0(x)dx,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rn,
(4.6)
where u(t)∗ and w(t)∗ are the mean of the optimal individual state feedback control
and disturbance, respectively.
4.2. Approximate computation of the mean-field equilibrium. We bor-
row from Bauso et al. (2014) the idea of studying the problem in the extended state
space involving both the vector state of the group and the average state distribution.
In the mean-field system (4.6) the gradient ∂xv(x, t) depends implicitly on the average
distribution m(t), which we can see as a parameter, and which evolves according to a
nonlinear differential equation. Then, we consider a new variable m˜t whose dynamics
approximates the nonlinear dynamics of m(t). In the extended state space, the state
variable evolves according to the equations
dX(t) = Fu(t)∗ + Ew(t)∗dt+ σdB(t), X(0) = x,
d
dtm(t) = Fu(t)
∗ + Ew(t)∗, m(0) = m0,
(4.7)
which can be rewritten in matrix form as[
dX(t)
dm(t)
]
=
([
F 0
0 F
] [
u(t)∗
u(t)∗
]
+
[
E 0
0 E
] [
w(t)∗
w(t)∗
])
dt+
[
σdB(t)
0
]
.
(4.8)
For this system we introduce an assumption on the rate of convergence of the state
m(t).
Assumption 4.1. There exists θ such that
d
dt
m(t) = Fu(t)∗ + Ew(t)∗ ≥ −θm(t), for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The above assumption implies that there exists a variable m˜(t) which approximates
the average distribution from below, that evolves according to{
d
dtm˜(t) = −θm˜(t), for all t ∈ [0, T ],
m˜0 = m0.
(4.9)
By substituting the current average distribution m¯t by its estimate m˜t the extended
state dynamics takes the form[
dX(t)
dm˜(t)
]
=
([ 0 0
0 −θ
] [
X(t)
m˜(t)
]
+
[
F
0
]
u(t)∗ +
[
E
0
]
w(t)∗
)
dt+
[
σdB(t)
0
]
.
(4.10)
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Given the above dynamics, we summarize the problem at hand as
inf
u(·)∈U
sup
w(·)∈W
{
J(x, u(·), w(·),m(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
1
2
[(m−X(t))T Q (m−X(t))
+u(t)TCu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)]dt+ Ψ(X(T ),m(T ))
]}
,
[
dX(t)
dm˜(t)
]
=
([
0 0
0 −θ
] [
X(t)
m˜(t)
]
+
[
F
0
]
u(t)∗ +
[
E
0
]
w(t)∗
)
dt+
[
σdB(t)
0
]
.
Reformulating the problem in terms of the extended state
X (t) =
[
X(t)
m˜(t)
]
,
yields the linear quadratic problem:
inf
u(·)∈U
sup
w(·)∈W
∫ T
0
[1
2
(
X (t)T Q˜X (t) + u(t)TCu(t)− w(t)TΓw(t)
) ]
dt+ Ψ(X (T ))
dX (t) =
(
A˜X (t) + B˜u˜(t) + C˜w(t)
)
dt+ E˜dB(t),
where
Q˜ =
[ −I
I
]
Q
[ −I I ] , Γ = 2γ2I, A˜ = [ 0 0
0 −θ
]
,
B˜ =
[
F
0
]
, C˜ =
[
E
0
]
, E˜ =
[
σ
0
]
.
The idea is therefore to consider a new value function V(X, m˜, t) (in compact form
V(X , t)) in the extended state space, which satisfies
∂tV(X , t) +H(X , ∂XV(X , t)) +
(
σ
2γ
)2
|∂xVt(X)|2
+ 12σ
2∂2xxV(X , t) = 0, in R2n × [0, T [,
V(X , T ) = Ψ(X ) in R2n.
Given that V(X , t) can be expressed in the quadratic form
V(X , t) = [XT (t) mT (t)]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (t)
[
X(t)
m(t)
]
,
where the matrix P (t) is the solution of the differential Riccati equation
P˙ (t) + P (t)A˜+ A˜TP (t) + Q˜/2 +W
−2P (t)(B˜C−1B˜T − C˜Γ−1C˜T )P (t) = 0,
(4.11)
where
B˜C−1B˜T − C˜Γ−1C˜T =
[
FC−1FT − 1γ2EET 0
0 0
]
,
W =
[
σ2P11(t) 0
0 0
]
.
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Note that in the stationary case the above differential equation simplifies to
PA˜+ A˜TP − 2P (B˜C−1B˜T − C˜Γ−1C˜T )P + Q˜/2 +W = 0. (4.12)
Let P (t) be the solution of the differential Riccati equation (4.11). Then, the optimal
control is given by
u˜(t) = −2C−1B˜TP (t)X (t)
= −2C−1[F 0]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
] [
X(t)
m(t)
]
= −2C−1β(P11(t)X(t) + P12(t)m(t)),
(4.13)
and the worst disturbance is
w˜(t) = 2Γ−1C˜TP (t)Xt
= 1γ2 I[E 0]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
] [
X(t)
m(t)
]
= 1γ2 IE(P11(t)X(t) + P12(t)m(t)).
(4.14)
The next subsection analyzes conditions for the existence of a mean field equilib-
rium for problem (4.6) in the cases of stationarity and zero-mean symmetric distribu-
tion.
4.3. Considerations on stationarity. A first step is the analysis of the HJI
equation in the stationary case. In this context, we look for a function Ψ that satisfies
the stationary HJI equation. Note that stationarity is obtained from (4.6) by dropping
the term ∂tv(x, t) and introducing the new variable Ψx:
1
2Ψ
T
x
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
Ψx +
1
2 (m(t)− x)TQ(m(t)− x) + 12σ2Tr(Ψ2xx) = 0, in Rn.
(4.15)
We want to analyze the influence of the disturbance on the value function Ψ.
Toward this end, for sake of simplicity, we take m = 0, and σ = 0. Then the HJI
equation in (4.15) turns out to be
1
2Ψ
T
x
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
Ψx +
1
2x
TQx = 0, in Rn, (4.16)
which is valid as long as −FC−1FT + 1γ2EET < 0 (see e.g. Appendix of (Bas¸ar
and Bernhard 1995) on the theory of conjugate points). Taking C = I for sake of
simplicity, the above condition becomes
−FFT + 1
γ2
EET < 0, (4.17)
which establishes a relation between the Fiedler eigenvalue or algebraic connectivity
of the Laplacian matrix FFT and the maximal eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix
EET .
4.4. Symmetric zero-mean distribution. Let us start by noting that a sta-
tionary mean distribution m0(x) together with a value function v(x, t) can be regarded
as a mean-field game equilibrium if they constitute a fixed point for (4.6). This re-
quires that, given the corresponding mean-field optimal control u∗(t) and worst dis-
turbance w∗(t), we have
Fu∗(t) = −Ew∗(t). (4.18)
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Let us suppose that m0 = 0 is a mean-field game equilibrium and that m0 is symmetric
with respect to zero (for instance is a Gaussian distribution or uniform distribution
with mean zero). Then, the HJI part of (4.6) becomes
∂tv(x, t) +
1
2Ψ
T
x
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
Ψx +
1
2x
TQx
+ 12σ
2Tr(∂2xxvt(x)) = 0, in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(0, x), in Rn.
(4.19)
Now, our goal is to obtain a suitable terminal cost Ψ such that there exists a solution
with m¯ ≡ 0.
Note that (4.19) has the form leading to a differential Riccati equation. To see
this, let us take v(x, t) = 12x
Tφ(t)x+ χ(t), and note that (4.19) can be rewritten as
χ˙(t) + 12 φ˙(t)x
2 + 12x
Tφ(t)T
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
φ(t)x+ 12x
TQx+ 12σ
2φ(t) = 0
in Rn × [0, T [, φ(T ) = S.
(4.20)
Since this is an identity in x, it reduces to two equations:
φ˙(t) + φ(t)T
(
− FC−1FT + 1γ2EET
)
φ(t) +Q = 0 in Rn × [0, T [,
φ(T ) = S,
χ˙(t) + 12σ
2φ(t) = 0, in [0, T [,
χ(T ) = 0.
(4.21)
The corresponding optimal control and worst-case disturbance are{
u∗(x, t) = −C−1FTφ(t)x
w∗(x, t) = 1γ2E
Tφ(t)x.
(4.22)
Given a symmetric distribution centered at zero, we have Fu(t) = Ew(t) =
0, and therefore (4.18) holds true. We can then conclude that the value function
obtained from a primitive of φ in (4.21), together with optimal control and worst-case
disturbance in (4.22) and a zero-mean symmetric distribution m, constitute a fixed
point for the reduced mean-field game (4.6) and as such they provide a mean-field
game equilibrium. A main question we will address in the following sub-sections is
whether this equilibrium is reachable dynamically, at least in the scalar case.
4.5. The scalar case. In this sub-section we provide a detailed analysis of the
scalar version of the earlier problem. Consider a population of homogeneous agents
(players), each one characterized by an opinion X(t) ∈ R at time t ∈ [0, T ], where
[0, T ] is the time horizon window. Let U be the control set. The control variable be
a measurable function of time, u(·) ∈ U , defined as t 7→ R and establishing the rate
of variation of an agent’s opinion. A persuader tries to perturb the opinions of the
agents in a way that is proportional to his advertisement efforts w(·) ∈ W , where W
is the control set of the persuader.
For this scalar case, the opinion dynamics can be written in the form (2.1) with
f : R× U ×W → R affine:{
dX(t) = (u(t) + w(t))dt+ σdB(t), t > 0
X(0) = x,
(4.23)
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where σ > 0 is a weighting coefficient and B(t) is a scalar Brownian motion process.
For the agents, consider a running cost g : R×R×U → [0,+∞[, (x,m, u) 7→ g(x,m, u)
of the form:
g(x,m, u) =
1
2
[
a(m− x)2 + cw2] . (4.24)
Also consider a terminal cost Ψ : R× R→ [0,+∞[, (m,x) 7→ Ψ(m,x) of the form
Ψ(m,x) =
1
2
S(m− x)2.
The problem is then the following:
minu(·) maxw(·) E
∫ T
0
[
g(X(t),m(t), u1(t))− γ
2
2 u2(t)
2
]
dt+ Ψ(m(T ), X(T )).
(4.25)
The following result then follows from Theorem 4.1 for this special scalar case.
Corollary 4.2. The mean-field system of the robust mean field game for the
crowd-seeking opinion propagation system is
∂tv(x, t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
|∂xv(x, t)|2 + 12a(m(t)− x)2 + 12σ2∂2xxv(x, t) = 0,
in R× [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in R,
∂tm(x, t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
∂x
(
m(x, t)∂xv(x, t)
)
− 12σ2∂2xxm(x, t) = 0,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in R.
(4.26)
Furthermore, the optimal control and worst-case disturbance are{
u∗(x, t) = − 1c1 ∂xv(x, t),
w∗(x, t) = 1γ2 ∂xv(x, t).
(4.27)
The significance of the above result is that to find the optimal control input
we need to solve the two coupled PDEs in (4.26) in v and m with given boundary
conditions (second and last conditions). This is usually done by iteratively solving
the HJI equation for fixed m and by entering the optimal u obtained from (4.27) in
the FPK equation in (4.26) until a fixed point in v and m is reached.
Note that the first part, namely, the HJI equation for fixed m, can be solved ex-
plicitly by assuming the value function being quadratic plus affine in x. Computation
of v(x, t) involves an oﬄine computation as detailed next.
Isolating the HJI part of (4.26) for fixed m, we have
∂tv(x, t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
|∂xv(x, t)|2 + 12a(m(t)− x)2 + 12σ2∂2xxv(x, t) = 0,
in R× [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(m(T ), x), in R.
(4.28)
Let us consider the following value function
v(x, t) =
1
2
φ(t)x2 + h(t)x+ χ(t),
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so that (4.28) can be rewritten as
1
2 φ˙(t)x
2 + h˙(t)x+ χ˙(t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
[φ(t)2x2 + h(t)2 + 2φ(t)h(t)x]
+ 12a(m(t)
2 + x2 − 2m(t)x) + 12σ2φ(t) = 0 in R× [0, T [,
φ(T ) = S, h(T ) = −Sm(T ), χ(T ) = 12Sm(T ).
(4.29)
Again, since this is an identity in x, it reduces to three equations:
φ˙(t) +
(
− 1c1 + 1γ2
)
φ(t)2 + a = 0 in [0, T [, φ(T ) = S,
h˙(t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
2φ(t)h(t)− am(t) = 0 in [0, T [, h(T ) = −Sm(T ),
χ˙(t) +
(
− 12c1 + 12γ2
)
h(t)2 + 12am(t)
2 + 12σ
2φ(t) = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 12Sm(T ).
(4.30)
For the optimal control and worst-case disturbance we have{
u∗(x, t) = − 1c1 (φ(t)x+ h(t))
w∗(x, t) = 1γ2 (φ(t)x+ h(t)).
(4.31)
4.5.1. Microscopic model. Consider a finite set of players {1, . . . , ν} and let
Yi(t) for all i = 1, . . . , ν, be the corresponding states. In order to provide a microscopic
description of the system evolution in vector form let us collect all states into a state
vector Y (t) = [Y1(t), . . . , Yn(t)]
T . Given the optimal controls u∗(x, t) and w∗(x, t) as
computed above, the evolution of the state vector is captured by the SDE
dY (t) =
(
1
c1
− 1
γ2
)
φ(m− Y (t))dt+ σdB(t). (4.32)
For future use, it is convenient to rewrite (4.32) making use of a stochastic matrix.
To do this, let us introduce
W = −
(
1
c1
− 1
γ2
)
φL+ I,
where L is the Laplacian of a fully connected network, i.e., its ith row appears as
Li• =
[
−1
ν
− 1
ν
. . .
ν − 1
ν
. . . − 1
ν
]
.
Note that
W = WT W1 = 1. (4.33)
Then, we can rewrite (4.32) as
dY (t) = [(W − I)Y (t)] dt+ σdB(t). (4.34)
The above equation is useful as it allows us to analyze the evolution of the stochas-
tic properties of the mean opinion m(t). Indeed, observe that m(t) is a stochastic
process with first-order moment satisfying
Edm(t) = 0.
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However, the realization follows the law
dm(t) = 1ν1
T dY (t)
= 1ν1
T (W − I)Y (t)dt+ 1ν1TσdB(t)
= 1ν1
TσdB(t).
(4.35)
Now, our aim is to analyze convergence of the agents to their average. Toward
this goal, define the averaging matrix M = 1n1⊗ 1. Then for a given vector Y (t) we
have MY (t) = ( 1n1 ⊗ 1)Y (t) = 1n11TY (t) = m(t)1. In other words, MY (t) is the
vector all of whose components are the average of the entries of Y (t). The averaging
matrix is useful to introduce the error vector e(t) describing the deviations of the
components of Y (t) from their average values. For the error vector we can write the
expression below, which relates e(t) to Y (t):
e(t) = Y (t)− 1
n
1⊗ 1TY (t)
= Y (t)−m(t)1
= (I −M)Y (t).
The next result establishes that the error vector converges to zero, which implies
that all opinions converge to the mean opinion.
Theorem 4.3. For each pi > 0, there exists an ε(pi) > 0 such that
P(‖e(t)‖∞ ≤ ε(pi)) > 1− pi. (4.36)
Proof. Given in the appendix.
5. Local interactions. The analysis conducted so far can be extended to the
case where p populations of players interact according to a predefined topology. The
probability density function is now indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . , p}. In other words we
consider a probability density function mk : Rn × [0,+∞[→ R, (x, t) 7→ mk(x, t),
which satisfies
∫
Rn mk(x, t)dx = 1 for every t. Similarly, we define the local mean
state of population k at time t as mk(t) :=
∫
R xmk(x, t)dx.
Let a graph G = (V,E) be given where V = {1, . . . , p} is the set of vertices,
one per each population, and E = V × V the set of edges. Let us denote the set of
neighbors of k by N(k) = {j ∈ V | (k, j) ∈ E}. Mean states of neighbor populations
are related by the following local interaction rule
d
dtρk(t) =
d
dtmk(t) +
∑
j∈N(k) ljk(ρj(t)− ρk(t)) (5.1)
By introducing L as the corresponding Laplacian matrix, and letting ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρp)
T ,
µ = ddt (m1,m2, . . . ,mp)
T , (5.1) can be rewritten in a compact form as
ρ˙(t) = −Lρ(t) + µ(t). (5.2)
In other words, local interactions involve a local averaging (the term including the
Laplacian) and a local adjustment. The local adjustment involving µ describes the
evolution of the average opinion as a result of the interactions among players in the
same population. We henceforth refer to ρ as the vector of aggregate states.
Equation (5.2) is general enough to include second-order consensus, in which case
the vector ρ is extended to include the derivatives ρ˙k(t), i.e.,
ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρp, ρ˙1, ρ˙2, . . . , ρ˙p)
T
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ν xmin xmax dt std(m0) T m0
103 −50 50 0.01 {8,10,15} 40 0
Table 6.1
Simulation parameters.
and similarly for matrix L. Second-order consensus will be considered in the simula-
tion analysis to highlight potential inter-cluster oscillations.
The objective of an agent is to adjust his state based on the aggregate kth state.
This reflects a typical crowd-seeking behavior based on local interaction.
Now, for the agents, consider a running cost g : R×R×U → [0,+∞[, (x, ρk, u) 7→
g(x, ρk, u) of the form (cf. (2.2)):
g(x, ρk, u, w) =
1
2
[
(ρk − x)T Q (ρk − x) + uTCu+ wTΓw
]
, (5.3)
Q > 0, C > 0, Γ < 0, and analogously for the terminal penalty that now takes the
form
Ψ(ρk, x) =
1
2
(ρk − x)TS(ρk − x), S > 0. (5.4)
The analysis carried out in the preceding sections still holds the only difference being
that every population is now tracking a distinct signal ρk and signals between neighbor
populations follow a consensus dynamics. As a result we may observe multi-scale
phenomena. On the one hand we have the synchronization of the agents belonging
to different populations to the local tracking signals ρk, which justifies the formation
of clusters. On the other hand, we may also observe, on a different time-scale, the
synchronization of the tracking signals ρk, k ∈ {1, . . . , p} which may lead to consensus
or polarization of the opinions.
6. Simulation examples. Numerical studies show a typical evolution leading
to an ε-consensus on opinions. This means that the agents’ opinions deviate from
one another by no more than ε. They have been conducted considering a number of
players ν = 103 and a discretized set of states X = {xmin, xmin + 1, . . . , xmax} where
xmin = 50 (minimum temperature) and xmax = 50 (maximum temperature). The
simulation parameters are listed in Table 6.1. We assume that the step size for the
simulation is dt = 0.01. The horizon length (number of iterations) is T = 40, large
enough to show convergence of the population regimes.
As regards the initial distribution, we assume m0 to be Gaussian with mean m0
equal to 0. For the examples, the standard deviation std(m0) is taken to be equal to
8, 10, and 15.
Example 1. The first simulation example has been carried out using the algorithm
displayed in Table 6.2. Figure 6.1, left, from top to bottom, shows the time plot
of the microscopic evolution of each agent’s opinion. The initial distribution m0
has mean zero, m0 = 0, and standard deviation std(m0) = 8 (top), std(m0) = 10
(middle), std(m0) = 15 (bottom). The graphs on the right column display the time
plot m(t) (solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and the evolution of the standard
deviation std(m(t)) (dashed line and y-axis labeling on the right). Note that, the
mean distribution m(t) is fixed to zero, and at approximately t = 20 the standard
deviation std(mt) drastically approaches a neighborhood of zero, which means that
all the agents’ opinions have reached ε-consensus around the persuader opinion.
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Algorithm
Input: Set of parameters as in Table 6.1
Output: Distribution function mt, mean mt and
standard deviation std(mt).
1 : Initialize. Generate x0 from Gaussian distri-
bution
with mean m¯0 and standard deviation std(m0),
2 : for time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if t > 0, then compute mt, mt, and std(mt),
4 : end if
5 : for player i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
6 : compute X(t+ 1) by executing (4.23),
7 : end for
8 : end for
9 : STOP
Table 6.2
Algorithm used for the simulations
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Fig. 6.1. Microscopic time plot (left) and time plot of mean distribution and standard deviation
(right).
Example 2. In a second example, we consider p = 5 distinct populations and analyze
the influence on the time plot of the opinions, of the local interaction topology. In
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particular, we consider a chain directed topology which has one single connected
component and a second-order consensus dynamics for ρ as in (5.1). Figure 6.2 shows
the microscopic time plot (left) and time plot of the standard deviation (right) for
increasing damping constant (from top to bottom). As a result all tracking signals
ρk, k = 1, . . . , 5 reach consensus on zero in case 2 (middle) and 3 (bottom), but not
in case 1 due to a too small damping constant. Inter-cluster oscillations are clearly
visible. It can also be observed that the agents within each population synchronize
at a faster rate than the one characterizing the consensus dynamics for ρ. Figure 6.3
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Fig. 6.2. Microscopic time plot (left) and time plot of standard deviation (right) with local
interaction.
shows the inter-cluster oscillations under a small damping constant. The damping
constant depends on the capability on the part of the players to predict the future
evolution of others’ opinions. Each individual uses not only the current values of
others’ opinions but also their derivatives. Farsighted players have a higher damping
constant. As in the mass-spring-damper dynamics, a small damping constant makes
convergence slow. If we take it asymptotically to zero, oscillations become persistent
and no convergence occurs. The plot highlights the fast synchronization of the
trajectories within each cluster.
Example 3. A third example is carried out in order to investigate the influence of the
topology on the consensus values for ρ. The example involves three different topologies
as illustrated in Fig. 7.1: directed chain with the top cluster as leader (left), directed
chain where the bottom cluster is leader (middle), topology with multiple connected
components (right). The time plot associated with the three cases is in Fig. 7.2 from
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Fig. 6.3. Microscopic time plot of the opinion for a small damping constant.
top to bottom. Note that in cases 1 and 2 we have consensus on opinions as the
clusters converge to a common value; the transient is characterized by inter-cluster
oscillations. Case 3 shows polarization of opinions due to the presence of multiple
connected components in the topology. Polarization implies that groups of clusters
converge to different values.
7. Conclusions. This paper has shown how repeated games, differential games
and mean field games can be intertwined to capture interactions among homogeneous
social groups when herding behavior is rewarding for the groups. For the selected
games, we have established a mean field equilibrium and studied state feedback best-
response strategies as well as worst-case adversarial disturbances. Future directions of
research involve the extension of the framework to other social behaviors (other types
of cost functions), as well as social dynamics. The impact that existing results and
techniques from repeated and population game literatures can have on social networks
is still a broad and open field of enquiry.
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APPENDIX. In this appendix, we provide proofs for Theorems 3.2-3.4 and 4.1-
4.3, which constitute the main results of the paper. We also recall a few definitions
from stochastic stability (Arnold 1974, Loparo and Feng 1996).
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. If condition (3.7) holds, then for all η ∈ Rn,
∃u ∈ U | ηT Fu > max
w∈W
ηT Ew.
Recalling that any point in a convex set can be expressed as a convex combination
of its vertices, we can use in the above equation the expression u =
∑p
i=1 uiu
(i) and
similarly w =
∑q
j=1 wjw
(j). The above condition then corresponds to saying that for
all η ∈ Rn there exists u ∈ ∆(Rp) such that
ηTF
p∑
i=1
uiu
(i) > max
w∈∆(Rq)
ηT
q∑
j=1
Ewjw
(j).
From the above condition, we can derive equivalently that for all η ∈ Rn there exists
u ∈ ∆(Rp) such that for all w ∈ ∆(Rq)
ηT
(
F
p∑
i=1
uiu
(i) + E
q∑
j=1
wjw
(j)
)
> 0.
Using the definition of f(u,w) provided in (3.8), the above condition can be rewritten
as, for all η ∈ Rn
∃u ∈ ∆(Rp) | ηT f(u,w) > 0, ∀w ∈ ∆(Rq).
Recalling the definition D1(u) = {f(u,w) : w ∈ ∆(Rq)}, the above condition implies
that
∃u ∈ ∆(Rp) | D1(u) ⊆ H = {x ∈ Rn| ηTx > 0}.
We conclude our proof by taking η = −λ and observing that this coincides with the
attainability condition (3.3).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Due to the bilinear structure of f , we can deduce that
the best-response strategy u∗ and worst adversarial disturbance w∗ are on a vertex of
the associated simplices in Rp and Rq, respectively. This corresponds to saying that
both strategies are pure strategies. We recall here that pure strategies are such that
each player chooses as a result a single predetermined action, in contrast with mixed
strategies where players select probabilities on actions and at time of play a random
mechanism consistent with the selected probability distribution determines the actual
action. A consequence of this is that the mean field equilibrium, if exists, is in pure
strategies as well.
From (3.11) we can we can rewrite the value of the anti-gradient projected game
as
val[∂xv] = inf
i∈I
sup
j∈J
Aijλ(∂xv),
where I = {1, . . . , p} and J = {1, . . . , q} are opportune sets of indices. Best responses
and adversarial strategies are then
(u∗, w∗) = arg min
i∈I
max
j∈J
Aijλ(∂xv).
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With the above definition of val[∂xv] in mind, the Hamilton-Jacobi part of (2.7)
can be rewritten as
vt + ‖vx‖val[vx] + 1
2
(m(t)− x(t))T Q (m(t)− x(t)) + σ
2
2
Tr(v2xx) = 0 in Rn × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = Ψ(x) ∀ x ∈ Rn. (7.1)
It is left to observe that f(u∗, w∗) = Ai∗j∗ and proves the third equation (FPK
equation).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. This proof mirrors in many parts the proof of Theorem
4.3 which contains more details. Let us start by observing that for the error vector
we have
dei(t) = dm(t)− dYi(t)
=
1
ν
ν∑
j=1
σdBj(t)− δφ(t)(m− Yi(t))dt− σdBi(t)dt
= −δφ(t)ei(t)dt+ 1
ν
ν∑
j=1
σdBj(t)− σdBi(t).
Note that the second term goes to zero for ν → ∞ so we can ignore it. The above
SDE is linear and the corresponding stochastic process can be studied in the frame-
work of stochastic stability theory (Loparo and Feng 1996). To do this, consider the
infinitesimal generator
L = 1
2
σ2
d2
dei(t)2
− δφ(t)ei(t) d
dei(t)
. (7.2)
Note that by definition φ(t) must be positive definite for all t ∈ [0, T ], i.e.,
ξTφ(t)ξ > 0 for all ξ ∈ Rn. We use this fact to study the infinitesimal generator
of the Lyapunov function V (e) = 12e
T e.
Our aim now is to prove that there exists a finite scalar κ and a neighborhood of
zero of size κ, denoted by Nκ = {e ∈ Rn|V (ei) ≤ κ}, such that LV (ei(t)) < 0 for all
ei(t) 6∈ Nκ, where L is the infinitesimal generator of the process ei(t).
Actually, the following lemma, borrowed from (Gard 1988), p. 129, and reported
also in (Thygesen 1997), Theorem 2, establishes that if the former condition holds true,
which is LV (ei(t)) < 0, then V (ei(t)) is a supermartingale whenever ei(t) is not in
Nκ and therefore by the martingale convergence theorem the system is stochastically
sample path bounded.
Lemma 7.1. (Stochastic sample path boundedness, cf. (Thygesen 1997), Theorem
2) Let there exist a proper C2 (twice differentiable) function V and a number κ > 0
such that for ‖ζ‖∞ > κ we have LV ≤ 0. Let τ = τ(κ) be the first exit time from
{ζ|‖ζ‖∞ > κ} for the solution ζ(t) where ‖ζ(0)‖∞ > κ. Then for each pi > 0 there
exists a ε(pi) such that
P( sup
0≤t≤τ
‖ζ(t)‖∞ ≤ ε(pi)) > 1− pi.
Proof. Sketch from (Thygesen 1997), proof of Theorem 2: the underlying idea is
to stop the process whenever ζ exits the region {ζ|κ ≤ ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ K} for a properly
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chosen K > κ. Then V applied to the stopped process is a super-mantigale. When
we let K → ∞, we have that the process stops for ‖ζ‖∞ = κ w.p.1. From the
super-martingale inequality applied to V we can conclude the proof.
With the above lemma at hand, let us first consider the SDE for the error vector,
dei(t) = −δφ(t)ei(t)dt− σdBi(t), and rewrite (I −M)σdB(t) =
∑
bidBi(t), where
bi = σ

− 1n
...
1− 1n
...
− 1n
 ith row. (7.3)
Then, for the infinitesimal generator of the Lyapunov function, we have
LV (ei) = −δei(t)Tφ(t)ei(t) + 1
2
σ2
n∑
i=1
φii(t),
where φii(t) is the iith entry of matrix φ(t).
Now, consider the level sets Nκ = {ei(t) ∈ Rn|V (ei(t)) ≤ κ}, and note that
there always exists a sufficiently large but finite κˆ such that for every ei(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, i.e.,
1
2ei(t)
T ei(t) > κˆ, we have −δei(t)Tφei(t) + 12σ2
∑n
i=1 φii(t) < 0. The latter means
LV (ei(t)) < 0 for all ei(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, which proves that every level set Nκ where κ ≥ κˆ is
contractive.
A value for kˆ can be obtained from the solution of the optimization problem{
kˆ := min k
{ei|V (ei) ≤ k} ⊃
{
ei| − δei(t)Tφei(t) + 12σ2
∑n
i=1 φii(t)
}
.
(7.4)
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first prove condition (4.5). To do this, let us write
the Hamiltonian as:
H(x, ∂xv(x, t),m) = inf
u
{1
2
[
(m− x)TQ(m− x) + uTCu]+ ∂xv(x, t)TFu}.
The robust Hamiltonian is then
H˜(x, ∂xv(x, t),m) = H(x, ∂xv(x, t),m) + sup
w
{
∂xv(x, t)
TEw − 1
2
γ2wTw
}
.
Differentiating with respect to u and w, we obtain{
Cu+ FT∂xv(x, t) = 0
−γ2w + ET∂xv(x, t) = 0, (7.5)
from which we can derive (4.5).
We now prove (4.4). First notice that the second and last equations are the bound-
ary conditions and follow straightforwardly from HJI equations and the evolution of
the law of states.
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To prove the first equation, which is a PDE corresponding to the HJI, let us
replace u∗ appearing in the Hamiltonian (7.5) by its expression (4.5):
H(x, ∂xv(x, t),m) =
1
2
[
(m− x)TQ(m− x) + u∗TCu∗]+ ∂xv(x, t)Fu∗
=
1
2
(m− x)TQ(m− x) + 1
2
∂xv(x, t)
TFC−1FT∂xv(x, t)− ∂xv(x, t)TFC−1FT∂xv(x, t)
=
1
2
(m− x)TQ(m− x)− 1
2
∂xv(x, t)
TFC−1FT∂xv(x, t).
Using the above expression of the Hamiltonian in the HJI equation in (4.3), we
obtain the HJI equation in (4.4).
To prove the third equation, which is a PDE representing the FPK equation, we
simply plug (4.5) into the FPK in (4.3), and this concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The time evolution of the error vector is given by the
SDE
de(t) = (I −M)dY (t)
= (I −M) [(W − I)Y (t)] dt+ (I −M)σdB(t)
= (W −M)Y (t)dt− (I −M)Y (t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t)
= (W −M)(I −M)Y (t)dt− e(t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t)
= (W −M− I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
e(t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t).
We obtain the second equality from the equation of dY (t) in (4.34). In the third
equality we use the fact MW =M. In the fourth equality we use the property
(W −M)(−M) = −WM+M2
= −W 1
n
11T +
1
n2
11T11T
= − 1
n
11T +
1
n
11T = 0.
Also, let A = W − M − I and rewrite the dynamics for error vector as de(t) =
Ae(t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t).
The above SDE is linear and the corresponding stochastic process can be studied
in the framework of stochastic stability theory (Loparo and Feng 1996). To do this,
consider the infinitesimal generator
L = 1
2
σ2(I −M)T (I −M) d
2
de(t)2
+Ae(t)
d
de(t)
. (7.6)
The above equation is obtained from
1
2
E
(
deT
d2
de2
de
)
+ E
(
de
d
de
)
=
1
2
[
E
(
e(t)TATAe(t)dt2
)
+E
(
σ2(I −M)T (I −M)dB(t)2)
+E
(
2e(t)TAT dtσ(I −M)dB(t))] d2
de(t)2
+ [E (Ae(t)dt) + E (σ(I −M)dB(t))] d
de(t)
.
Now, recalling that for a Brownian motion, EdB(t) = 0 and EdB(t)2 → 0 and ignoring
the second-order terms (in dt2 or dtdB(t)) we obtain (7.6).
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Note that from (4.33) we have that ‖W −M‖ < 1 which in turn implies that A
is negative definite, i.e., ξTAξ < 0 for all ξ ∈ Rn, ξ 6= 0. We use this fact to study the
infinitesimal generator of the Lyapunov function V (e) = 12e
T e.
Our aim now is to prove that there exists a finite scalar κ and a neighborhood of
zero of size κ, denoted by Nκ = {e ∈ Rn|V (e) ≤ κ}, such that LV (e(t)) < 0 for all
e(t) 6∈ Nκ, where L is the infinitesimal generator of the process e(t).
Actually, Lemma 7.1, borrowed from (Gard 1988), p. 129, and reported also in
(Thygesen 1997), Theorem 2, establishes that if the former condition holds, which
is LV (e(t)) < 0, then V (e(t)) is a supermartingale whenever e(t) is not in Nκ and
therefore by the martingale convergence theorem the system is stochastically sample
path bounded.
With the above lemma at hand, let us first consider the SDE for the error vector,
de(t) = Ae(t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t), and rewrite (I −M)σdB(t) = ∑ bidBi(t), where
bi = σ

− 1n
...
1− 1n
...
− 1n
 ith row. (7.7)
Then, for the infinitesimal generator of the Lyapunov function, we have
LV (e) = e(t)TAe(t) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
Σii
= e(t)TAe(t) +
1
2
nσ2[(n− 1) 1
n2
+ (1− 1
n
)2],
where Σ =
∑n
k=1 bkb
T
k ∈ Rn×n, whose elements in the principal diagonal are Σii =
σ2[(n− 1) 1n2 + (1− 1n )2].
Now, consider the level sets Nκ = {e(t) ∈ Rn|V (e(t)) ≤ κ} and note that there
always exists a κˆ big enough and finite such that for every e(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, i.e., 12e(t)T e(t) >
κˆ, we have e(t)TAe(t)+ 12nσ
2[(n−1) 1n2 +(1− 1n )2] < 0. The latter means LV (e(t)) < 0
for all e(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, which proves that every level set Nκ where κ ≥ κˆ is contractive.
In other words, for every e(t) ∈ ∂Nκˆ, e(t + dt) ∈ Nκˆ. The same reasoning leads
to the conclusion that every level set Nκ where κ ≥ κˆ is contractive. Thus, we
can conclude that for every κ ≥ κˆ there exists an ε = √2κ for which the level set
{m ∈ R| ‖m‖ ≤ ε} is contractive. A value for kˆ can be obtained from the solution of
the optimization problem{
kˆ := min k
{e|V (e) ≤ k} ⊃ {e| e(t)TAe(t) + 12nσ2[(n− 1) 1n2 + (1− 1n )2] < 0} . (7.8)
This concludes the proof.
33
